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1Editor’s Introduction
The third issue of the journal is composed of three articles and a review essay. Two of the articles deal with aspects of Indian domestic politics, while the third is focused on India’s bilateral relations with one of its most important 
neighbors, Bangladesh. The review essay is based on Srinath Raghavan’s book, The 
Most Dangerous Place, a panoramic account of US–India relations. 
Nitasha Kaul’s article, “The Political Project of Postcolonial Neoliberal Na-
tionalism” focuses on the success of right-wing electoral politics with the seem-
ingly odd yoking of neoliberalism and nationalism. She argues that the two social 
forces, though apparently at odds, have actually worked in tandem. Using the In-
dian case especially under the Narendra Modi regime, she demonstrates how they 
have worked in concert despite their seeming opposition. 
Hugo Gorringe and Suryakant Waghmore, in their article, “‘Go Write on 
the Walls That You are the Rulers of the Nation’: Dalit Mobilization and the BJP,” 
argue that while the 2014 electoral success of the BJP was seen as a triumph of 
developmental questions over identity issues, in actuality the BJP’s moderation 
has proved to be limited. Not surprisingly, they contend, the last two years have 
witnessed an increase in Dalit mobilization against the BJP. 
Ali Riaz’ article “The Indo-Bangladesh Relationship: ‘Saath Saath (Togeth-
er) or Too Close for Comfort?’” discusses the India–Bangladesh relationship in 
recent years. He believes that over the past decade relations between the two states 
have been quite cordial and especially between the ruling parties. He also shows 
that during this period a number of contentious issues have been resolved, but 
others nevertheless remain. The article then discusses the prospects of the evo-
lution of the relationship given the resolution of a range of issues while still con-
fronting others that still remain problematic. 
Aparna Pande’s review essay, based on Srinath Raghavan’s book, Fierce 
Enigmas (published in India as The Most Dangerous Place), shows how US–India 
relations have evolved since the eighteenth century to the present day. While the 
US and India currently enjoy a multifaceted and burgeoning relationship, it was 
not always so. Pande, based on Raghavan’s findings, shows that US engagement 
with India was all too often held hostage to other actors and events. It frequently 
fell victim to the American quest for quick results. Despite a long history of peo-
ple-to-people contacts, mutual ideas of exceptionalism led the two states to view 
each other with suspicion. Today, the relationship owes much to a common con-
cern about the rise of the People’s Republic of China . However, as Pande notes, the 
relationship still remains susceptible to American policy fluctuations as President’s 
Trump’s actions on a range of bilateral and regional issues have demonstrated.
doi: 10.18278/inpp.2.1.1
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With this issue, we say goodbye to our Assistant Editor, Brandon Miliate, 
who upon the successful defense of his dissertation, will become the South and 
Southeast Asian Studies Librarian at Yale University Libraries. We wish him the 
best for a successful career. In the next issue, we will welcome Aashna Khanna, 
a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at Indiana University, 
Bloomington, as his successor.
Sumit Ganguly, Editor, Indiana University, Bloomington
Surupa Gupta, Managing Editor, University of Mary Washington 
Nicolas Blarel, Associate Editor, University of Leiden
Neil DeVotta, Associate Editor, Wake Forest University
Ronojoy Sen, Associate Editor, National University of Singapore
Arzan Tarapore, Book Review Editor, National Bureau of Asian Research
Brandon Joseph Miliate, Assistant Editor, Indiana University, Bloomington
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Abstract
The starting point of this article is the recognition of globally pro-
liferating right-wing electoral successes of a specific kind that rely 
upon a weaving together of seemingly contradictory aspects of 
neoliberalism and nationalism. An important dimension of these 
globally occurring changes is that they reflect something more 
than simply the empirical instantiation of a right-wing success in 
any one specific context. They require us to unravel and under-
stand the transmutations in the nature of the political and the eco-
nomic in the contemporary postcolonial world. Here, I focus on 
the relevance of uncovering the powerful weave of nationalism, 
neoliberalism, and postcolonialism that lies behind such configu-
rations of power; a governmentality I refer to as PNN (postcolonial 
neoliberal nationalism). An understanding of PNN requires us to 
challenge the a priori availability of analysis of either neoliberalism 
or nationalism in isolation; neoliberalism and nationalism are not 
only not contradictory to each other, but as projects of re-forming 
imaginaries, they co-constitute the ideas of “market/economy” and 
“nation/culture.” Furthermore, PNN makes visible the ambivalent 
status of “the West,” since it is imbued with the historical legacy of 
colonial memory re-called into the present as a revanchist pride, 
and combined with the conflicting aspirational/actual consump-
tion desires to emulate the capitalist imperial metropolitan fanta-
sies. I use the example of India to illustrate how PNN has been 
enacted as a technique of governmentality by the Modi-led BJP 
government through the reformulation of Swadeshi and the Make 
in India project.
Keywords: Nationalism, Neoliberalism, India, Postcolonial, Modi, 
Swadeshi, Governmentality, Hindutva, Economy, Culture
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El proyecto político del nacionalismo 
neoliberal poscolonial
Resumen
El punto de partida de este artículo es el reconocimiento los cre-
cientes éxitos electorales de la derecha en el mundo, los cuales son 
de un tipo específico y dependen del entrelazamiento de aspectos 
del neoliberalismo y el nacionalismo que parecen ser contradic-
torios. Una dimensión importante de estos cambios que ocurren 
globalmente es que reflejan algo más que simplemente la instan-
ciación empírica de un éxito de la derecha en cualquier contexto 
específico. Nos exigen desarmar y comprender las transmutaciones 
en la naturaleza de lo político y lo económico en el mundo posco-
lonial contemporáneo. Aquí me enfoco en la relevancia de descu-
brir la poderosa coyuntura de nacionalismo, neoliberalismo y pos-
colonialismo que está detrás de estas configuraciones e poder: una 
condición de gobierno que llamo PNN (Nacionalismo Neoliberal 
Colonial). Una comprensión del PNN requiere que desafiemos la 
disponibilidad previa para el análisis del neoliberalismo o del na-
cionalismo de forma aislada; El neoliberalismo y el nacionalismo 
no solo no son contradictorios entre sí, sino que, como proyec-
tos de nuevos imaginarios, co-constituyen las ideas de “mercado 
/ economía” y “nación / cultura”. Además, el PNN hace visible el 
estado ambivalente de ‘Occidente’, ya que está impregnado del lega-
do histórico de la memoria colonial, revivido en el presente como 
un orgullo revanchista, y combinado con los deseos de consumo 
aspiracional / real en conflicto para emular fantasías metropolita-
nas imperiales capitalistas. Utilizo el ejemplo de India para ilustrar 
cómo el PNN ha sido promulgado como una técnica de gobierno 
por la administración BJP liderada por Modi a través de la refor-
mulación de Swadeshi y el proyecto Make in India.
Palabras clave: nacionalismo, neoliberalismo, India, poscolonial, 
Modi, Swadeshi, condición de gobierno, Hindutva, economía, 
cultura
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具备后殖民性质和新自由主义性
质的民族主义政治计划
摘要
本文出发点认可了一种正在全球扩散的右翼选举成功，这种
成功依赖于看似相互抵触的新自由主义和民族主义二者的相
互交织。这些全球变化中重要的一面则是，变化不仅仅反映
了右翼在任何特定背景下所获的成功。它还要求我们解开并
理解当代后殖民世界中政治和经济方面的变化。笔者聚焦于
发现民族主义、新自由主义和后殖民主义三者间相互交织的
相关性，这种相关性潜伏于一种权力配置，后者是一种治理
术，笔者称之为“具备后殖民性质和新自由主义性质的民族
主义”（PNN）。理解PNN则需要对此前关于单独分析新自
由主义或民族主义一事发起挑战；新自由主义和民族主义不
仅不冲突，反而作为重塑假想的计划，共同组成了“市场/经
济”和“国家/文化”的概念。此外，PNN将“西方”模棱两
可的状态变得清晰，因为其充满了殖民历史影响——现称之
为复仇主义自豪，同时结合了冲突的/实际的消费欲望来模仿
资本主义帝国都市幻想。作者以印度为例，阐述了由莫迪领
导的印度人民党政府如何通过重塑“抵制外货”政策和“印
度制造”计划，进而将PNN作为一种治理术。
关键词：民族主义，新自由主义，印度，后殖民，莫迪，抵
制外货（Swadeshi），治理术，印度教民族主义，经济，文化
It is as if the masses have kept a secret to themselves while the intel-
lectuals keep running around in circles trying to make out what it is, 
what is going on.
—Stuart Hall1
Introduction
The starting point of this article is the recognition of globally proliferating right-wing elector-
al successes of a specific kind that rely 
upon a together of seemingly contra-
dictory aspects of neoliberalism and 
nationalism. A significant number of 
elected right-wing leaders across the 
contemporary world are simultaneous-
ly championing both nationalism and 
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neoliberalism, but at the same time, 
their rise is commonly seen in terms of 
a nationalist response to neoliberalism, 
one that is predicated upon an opposi-
tional understanding of the dynamics of 
nationalism and neoliberalism. Further, 
they do this by motivating projects that 
combine appeals to nostalgia, futurity, 
and pride, in ways that entangle con-
cepts of nation and economy, and this is 
the case in countries that were former-
ly colonized, as well as those that were 
colonizers. This article is an attempt to 
unpack this conundrum, using the ex-
ample of India. 
An important dimension of these 
globally occurring changes is that they 
reflect something more than simply 
the empirical instantiation of a right-
wing success in any one specific con-
text. In fact, they require us to unrav-
el and understand the transmutations 
in the nature of what is understood as 
the “political” and the “economic” in 
the contemporary postcolonial world. 
Before proceeding further, I emphasize 
that the signifier “postcolonial” is used 
here in a nonhyphenated manner,2 not 
in a “thin” sense to indicate the chrono-
logical aftermath of being colonized, 
but in a “thick” sense to indicate the 
significance of inhabiting a global pres-
ent which continues to be marked by 
the colonial encounters and the ways in 
which the inherited legacies of “race,” 
“religion,” and “nation” are coded prox-
ies for power that continue to shape the 
politics of the socio-economic behavior 
of individuals, the attitudes of collectiv-
ities, the implicit hierarchies of/within 
international institutions. In this sense, 
we all live in a postcolonial world (a 
world marked by the power asymme-
tries of the colonial encounter), where 
the colonial legacies may be re-called 
into the present as imperial nostalgia 
by the former colonizers, or as revan-
chist pride by the formerly colonized, 
but they continue to be salient nonethe-
less. Postcoloniality, thus, makes it in-
cumbent upon us to take into account 
the role and status of the “West” in 
the way in which it continues to act as 
both an attractor and a repulser in the 
socio-economic architecture of global 
politics.3
Keeping this in mind, and pro-
ceeding further, this paper is motivat-
ed by how, in the contemporary glob-
al moment marked by a simultaneous 
ascendancy of neoliberalism and na-
tionalism, the categories “economic” 
and “political” are often assumed to 
function separately and with their own 
endogenous logics. Analyzing the dy-
namics of nationalism and neoliberal-
ism in isolation obscures the ways in 
which these discourses co-constitute 
the spaces that later come to be iden-
tified as belonging to the “economy” or 
the “nation.” Hegemonic projects, such 
as those of the right wing in the present, 
owe their success to how they weave to-
gether what are generally perceived to 
be contradictory aspects of nationalism 
and neoliberalism. To highlight this, I 
will argue for an articulation of “postco-
lonial neoliberal nationalism” (PNN), 
proposing it to be the functioning of a 
governmentality that I will illustrate in 
the context of India.
Here, a space-clearing gesture 
would be to address the rationale for 
using the term neoliberalism.4 Clarke 
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generates a long list of sites, institu-
tions, processes, and practices that he 
recognizes as being identified as neo-
liberal.5 It is a nonexhaustive list, and 
though he sees this as a potential prob-
lem when finding spaces of resistance 
uncontaminated by neoliberalism, I 
would argue that articulating neoliber-
alism with nationalism and postcolo-
niality, in fact, “reduces its density and 
totalizing weight—and the analytical 
and political breathlessness that such 
weight induces.”6 This is because a con-
ceptualization of “PNN” allows a more 
complex understanding of the terms on 
which the economic and the cultural, or 
the nation and the international, or the 
state and the market become visible to 
us as separate, and the ideological work 
performed by seeing these domains as 
having endogenous internal logics. 
For instance, the example of 
India under the BJP (Bharatiya Jana-
ta Party) rule is one where neoliberal 
practices get legitimized as a matter of 
nationalist pride for they are deemed 
to enable the “rise” of postcolonial In-
dia. In India, through its use of PNN, 
the BJP wants to emulate the West in 
terms of neoliberal policies, keep it at 
bay in terms of ideas of secularity, and 
compete with it by “rising” as a global 
power. 
Existing work on the intersec-
tions of neoliberalism and nationalism 
in the Indian context largely focuses on 
trajectories of capital accumulation and 
social forces mediated by the dynamics 
of class, caste, region, and religion that 
led to the dramatic rightward shift in 
Indian politics and economy toward the 
end of the twentieth century onward. 
Vanaik7 succinctly outlines the key par-
adoxes of Indian society as fractured by 
various social forces—liberal democra-
cy inserted into a predominantly rural 
society, regionally diverse, with divisive 
religious politics yet integrative caste 
politics, divided along linguistic elec-
toral lines, industrializing with differ-
ential and uneven cultural and political 
weight distribution among rural and 
urban elites, making the middle class 
a base for Hindutva politics, and a Left 
that is no threat to the bourgeoisie. 
Against this backdrop, the changes of 
the recent years have, on one hand, been 
conceptualized as a transition from de-
velopmental to cultural nationalism, so 
that while the former was rooted in the 
paradoxes of political economy, the lat-
ter fetishizes culture to account for the 
lack of material transformations that 
were envisaged.8 On the other hand, 
the recent changes have also created the 
impetus for new analyses that link the 
ways the Hindutva project has sought 
to marketize religion by a repositioned 
understanding of state, society, and 
markets, that facilitates entrepreneur-
ial, self-regulating, spiritual notion of 
citizenship that suits both market in-
terests and religious nationalism.9 The 
argument in this paper is sympathetic 
to, and complementarily builds upon, 
these directions of inquiry; however, 
this paper is not an interrogation of the 
historical Indian project of nation and 
class formation, or a postulation of the 
chronological transitions within this 
trajectory, or an attempt to account for 
the successful rise to power of the BJP 
in India. 
Indian Politics & Policy
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The claims made here are as fol-
lows: there is an interpretive value in 
challenging the oppositional under-
standing of neoliberalism and national-
ism where it exists (and notwithstand-
ing the exceptions discussed above, it 
is a ubiquitous dichotomy); it allows us 
to make visible how this binary facili-
tates a systematic local/international, 
material/symbolic, regressive/progres-
sive mapping; it enables us to refuse the 
distinction between political economy 
and cultural politics so as to reclaim an 
analytical space for a governmentality 
approach that focuses on the function-
ing of the always already co-constituted 
imaginaries of “nation” and “economy” 
in the construction of subjects to obtain 
consent for specific policy regimes. 
The final prefatory remark would 
be to note that the “non-West” is often 
taken to be the site that demonstrates 
the validity, applicability, or otherwise 
of theoretical approaches that come 
from, and draw upon, the experienc-
es and dynamics as understood in the 
“West.” In this sense, this paper also 
adopts a postcolonial epistemological 
stance,10 whereby through the discus-
sions related to uncovering a nuanced 
form of governmentality in India, it is 
also an invitation to other scholars to 
explore how these dynamics play out in 
the West, where the hegemonic right-
wing successes of the recent years have 
relied upon inverted imaginaries (in, for 
instance, projects such as “Brexit” and 
“Make America Great Again”) of re-
covering, not a pre-colonial purity and 
power, to heal from a colonial wound 
as in postcolonial (hyphenated chrono-
logical sense of the word being used 
here) countries, but a desire for return 
to a (quasi)imperial past as political 
nostalgia that also allows the combin-
ing of seemingly contradictory aspects 
of neoliberalism and nationalism.
Rethinking the Narratives
Neoliberalism and Nationalism are rarely analyzed for the ways in which they are intertwined, 
and more often pitted against each oth-
er as opposing tendencies. In exception-
al cases, when the two are reconciled, 
it still relies upon a schematic under-
standing of two autonomous domains 
with their own endogenous logics.11 
Neoliberalism is generally char-
acterized by the way in which it de-
territorializes capital, disrupts tradi-
tional communitarian affiliations of 
identity, and weakens the underlying 
foundations of the nation-state by shift-
ing power toward the globally mobile 
transnational corporate entities, and 
away from the governments that are 
faced with ever greater constraints in 
terms of what they can regulate, how, 
and to what extent. Nationalism, on 
the other hand, is seen in terms of how 
the nation either creates an associated 
sense of identity and belonging or how 
the collective imagining of a nation, as 
an entity, manufactures a sense of be-
longing and affiliation. In line with this, 
the dominant narratives of the present 
see the successes of the right wing as 
a nationalist reaction to the neoliberal 
transformation. There are a number of 
analyses that seek to focus on the vic-
tory of a Trump or a Modi as a reaction 
of the working classes or the poor who 
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9
have lost out from the process of neo-
liberal globalization.12 It is possible to 
complicate this picture, both empirical-
ly (such as by analyzing the socio-eco-
nomic backgrounds of the specific 
demographics who voted for the right-
wing) and, as I will go on to argue, the-
oretically. 
Even in more nuanced consid-
erations of the interrelations between 
neoliberalism and nationalism, the un-
derlying narrative remains one of there 
being an oppositional relationship be-
tween the two. For example, looking at 
neoliberalism in terms of an ideology, 
a strategy and an era, Davidson and 
Saull study its contradictions when it 
is embraced by the nonrevolutionary, 
restoration politics of the far-right.13 
They write: “Neoliberalism, then, has 
helped create the conditions for the 
re-emergence of the far-right whilst, at 
the same time, the far-right has focused 
on attacking what it sees as the symp-
toms of neoliberalism through racializ-
ing its social, political and economic ef-
fects.”14 Assessing the changing fortunes 
of political traditions, Crouch sees the 
coalitions among parties representing 
neoliberalism and conservatism as “an 
alliance of two horses going in diver-
gent directions.”15 Here too, we find this 
idea: “Through their endorsement of 
neoliberal change, conservatives help 
usher in globalisation, but through their 
identification with the nation they can 
then gain from the revived nationalism 
that opposition to globalisation stim-
ulates.”16 This contradiction between 
the two is also often mapped through 
the global and the local binary. Cas-
tro-Rea17 traces the ascendancy of the 
neoliberal project in Mexico as an iter-
ation of a modernization project which 
had a defining moment when NAFTA 
was adopted; “inspired from abroad, 
based on alien cultural assumptions, yet 
sitting on the side of institutional politi-
cal power,” it is a project doomed to fail 
because it is fundamentally at odds with 
a “deep Mexico,” the indigenous “Méx-
ico profundo” of Mesoamerican civili-
zation.18 
These narratives hinge upon, and 
require, a systematic understanding of 
an oppositional binary as the key dy-
namic between the global and local, the 
material and the symbolic, the neolib-
eral and nationalist. They can be prob-
lematic for at least two reasons. On one 
hand, they lay out and implicit grid of 
values where openness, cosmopolitan-
ism, and progressivism can only ever 
fall on the neoliberal or the interna-
tional (read western) side of the binary. 
Hence, the signifier West and its coming 
into being is insufficiently interrogated. 
On the other hand, maintaining these 
binaries requires the depoliticization of 
the category economic so that a certain 
modernist rendition of economic logic 
is presented to as transparent, univer-
sal, inevitable, and as the only possible 
form of rationality.
By making sense of the dynam-
ics and the impacts of neoliberalism 
and nationalism in separate registers, 
we miss out on understanding pre-
cisely how a separate and separable 
understanding of neoliberalism and 
nationalism makes it possible for a gov-
ernmentality to operate by fashioning a 
kind of political subjectivity that feels 
Indian Politics & Policy
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about the nation but accepts the econo-
my as beyond the “common person.” If, 
following Foucault, government is seen 
as the “conduct of conduct,” governing 
can be understood as controlling the 
possible field of action of others, as the 
producing of governable subjects. An 
analysis of governmentality is therefore 
inclusive of understanding the practic-
es of government within institutions of 
the state and the process of governing 
and the mentality of government to-
ward the end of manufacturing the will 
of the governed.19 An analytics of gov-
ernment is also to ask how the practices 
of governing give rise to specific forms 
of truth. 
If we see neoliberalism and na-
tionalism in isolation, we observe that 
at the heart of neoliberal utopian gov-
ernmentality lies the aim of creating 
subjects who are active, efficient, and 
able; which is to say that they give con-
sent to their own calculable deploy-
ment in a fluid, amoral, unembedded, 
and transparent manner. In contradis-
tinction to this, the kind of submission 
required of the aims of the nationalist 
utopian governmentality is different; 
the subject possesses the ability to act 
on emotions and yet be bounded by the 
authority of tradition. The reproduc-
tion of these ideals is driven by imag-
inaries, but these are not necessarily 
continuous imaginaries. Moreover, in 
a postcolonial world, the imaginaries 
of both these discourses rely upon both 
pride and futurity in ways that end up 
seeming contradictory—so we have, 
right-wing nationalists in power who 
promise to return glory to a nation, and 
simultaneously support both closer re-
lationships with their economic rivals, 
cut corporate taxes, outsource and in-
vite foreign investment, remove labor 
and environmental regulations, and 
speak of enforcing tariffs and support 
of domestic jobs and industries. They 
are both nationalist and neoliberal at 
the same time. Far from being inept or 
acting in error, these departures from 
the standard scripts of nationalism and 
neoliberalism in the economic and cul-
tural domains are key to the hegemony 
of the project of the Right today. 
With this in mind, it is possi-
ble to argue the following. Neoliberal-
ism, as a technique of governmentality, 
works by creating political outcomes 
that are seen as purely economic ones 
by its adherents. It works to create a 
society where capital is privileged over 
labor, those with more capital are priv-
ileged over those with less, and where 
attempts to change the former two (i.e., 
trying to alter the balance to revalue la-
bor, or revalue those with less capital) 
by any means of policy (for example, 
unionization, regulation, nationaliza-
tion instead of “flexible” labor markets, 
deregulation, privatization) is seen as 
unscientific, irrational, or both, by de-
fining and facilitating the understand-
ing of rationality in purely economic 
terms and economic/s as a scientism 
devoid of history or ideology. Neolib-
eralism, as a technique of governmen-
tality, produces individuals subjected 
to this power of capital over labor, and 
keeps in place the epistemic obstacles 
to recognizing and altering this bal-
ance. Furthermore, the neoliberal axis 
of power is vertical. Neoliberalism 
can be said to create a differentiation 
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though the Hegelian power relation 
of the Master and Slave. The state and 
the neoliberal market forces encounter 
and proceed to a struggle, whereby the 
state may see its powers eroded by the 
neoliberal reforms that enable transna-
tional corporations to make a play of its 
injunctions, or it may see itself as a bol-
stering ally of these same corporations 
as it creates injunctions to enable the 
play of neoliberalism. The state is not 
in any fundamentally determinist sense 
opposed to the market, the state can be 
rolled back by the market, or it may be 
expanded as a useful ally of the market. 
One might even say in a Hegelian vein 
that the market only becomes “free” 
with the help of the state.
Nationalism, as a technique of 
governmentality, works by creating po-
litical outcomes that are seen as intrin-
sically cultural by its adherents. It works 
to create a society where a majority is 
manufactured into the rightful Self and 
defined against an enemy Other, and 
any attempts to challenge the existence 
or nature of the dividing line are seen as 
unpatriotic, irrational, or both, by de-
fining and facilitating an understanding 
of patriotism on the terms of the ma-
jority alone, and presenting rationality 
as pure Self-interest. Nationalism, as a 
technique of governmentality, produces 
individuals subjected to the divide be-
tween the Self and the Other in/of the 
nation. In a necessary circularity, the 
nation is defined as preceding the na-
tionalism that it supposedly naturally 
creates. Nationalism creates differentia-
tion through the Schmittian horizontal 
power hierarchy of the Friend and the 
Enemy. The State, again, can be nation-
alist and colonial, or postcolonial na-
tionalist and colonial in terms of how it 
sees the enemy. The State may abet ma-
jority nationalism, or it may seek it un-
dermine it. 
The postcolonial nature of the 
present means that both nationalism 
and neoliberalism have the nation-state 
entangled right at the heart of their un-
derstanding, a tranversality that cuts 
through dynamics of neoliberalism and 
nationalism. The positing of the na-
tion-state as a dominant form for orga-
nizing our understanding of socio-eco-
nomic dynamics is worth noting in 
terms of coloniality of the nation-state 
form and the commodification of the 
nation-state form.
The contemporary nation-state 
is Eurocentric—in its conceptual or-
igin, in the key institutions that facil-
itate interactions between such na-
tion-states, and in the hierarchical 
imaginaries associated with them and 
their colonial/“race” basis.20 The twenti-
eth-century era of decolonizations was 
also simultaneously the proliferation of 
the nation-state21 as a form in the newly 
postcolonial states. So, we have this hy-
phenated entity (the nation-state) that 
acts as a focal referent for the exercise 
of power in relation to territory, iden-
tity, and capital. This overworked idea 
of the nation-state in the present car-
ries many burdens: citizens must feel 
pride in the nation, but not nationalize 
their industries; the systems must work 
on neoliberal tenets derived from neo-
classical economic theory where equi-
librium requires the free movement 
of the factors of production, but labor 
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cannot be allowed to move freely across 
the borders of nation-states; all inter-
nationally recognized nation-states are 
in theory equal legal persons, but in 
practice some are more equal than oth-
ers. All the same, the nation-state must 
both be the source of nourishing affec-
tive belonging (give its citizens an em-
powering sense of identity that they can 
feel pride in) and also be able to reflect 
ever better in the global league of other 
such nation-states (the rate at which its 
economy grows); in other words, a na-
tion-state must be able to tell the best 
possible story about itself to its own cit-
izens and to the rest of the world. This 
is a task filtered through a processing of 
the coloniality of history and memory.
Colonialism was an erasure of 
multiple histories, and in the postco-
lonial world that we find ourselves in, 
memory itself is sought to be colonized. 
This is what the right-wing movements 
in the formerly colonized nation-states 
seek to do when they refer to the purity 
of a mythical national past prior to the 
“taint” of colonization. They promise a 
return to a more vigorous nation, which 
has regained its moral and civilizational 
purity, healing from the colonial wound 
by reaching back in time to relive the 
present as the glorious past. However, 
this is not all. The appeal of a successful 
right-wing movement in a formerly col-
onized state draws not merely from this 
identitarian nativism; it derives equal-
ly from the promise of a future where 
the healing of the colonial wound can 
only be complete by achieving a level 
of consumption and lifestyle “like the 
West.” In this sense, to have neoliberal 
ethos (to carry out the “reforms” need-
ed) is to be modern like everyone else 
in the international system, to have 
the same consumption aspirations, to 
have finally achieved “a sense of pride” 
and a place in the sun. This powerful 
and interlinked postcolonial–neoliber-
al–nationalist imaginary gets an addi-
tional fillip when media discourses in 
the West mock the “backwardness” of 
non-Western nations.22 
Rather than perceiving the neo-
liberal, the nationalist, and the postco-
lonial, as inhabiting separate, though 
occasionally overlapping, registers, it is 
more fruitful to acknowledge the pol-
itics of this separation, and recognize 
that discourses and practices of neolib-
eralism and nationalism are tied with 
other ways of seeing/doing politics, and 
the present global resurgence of the 
right wing is happening in a world with 
postcolonial sentiment and re-senti-
ment. A PNN that co-constructs the 
idea of nation and economy—is at work 
as a strategy of governmentality that 
creates a political subjectivity where 
the population is faced with what one 
might call the “politics of the absurd.” 
In this politics of the absurd, the 
conventional sense of what is “political” 
is partly lost. Nationalism, including 
identity, pride, and hatred, gets mobi-
lized as a natural part of the affective 
politics, while questions of ideologies, 
distribution of wealth, survival, and/
or livelihood that ought to be central 
to politics are put into the “safe house” 
of economy beyond the realm of pub-
lic debate. Politics, as a field of contes-
tation between competing and iden-
tifiably different ideological domains, 
recedes from view. Thus, a technocratic 
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rationality places what is properly polit-
ical as the beyond of investigation and 
critique. The fundamental political and 
economic questions become obscured, 
while the population sees the effects of 
specific responses to such political and 
economic questions, presented to them 
as being inevitable. What is more, the 
technocratically determined idea of ra-
tionality in governance makes conflicts 
of interests become unidentifiable. That 
which is most obviously in view be-
comes structured in such a manner that 
it is naturalized and rendered obscure 
from questioning. For example, in this 
politics of the absurd, inequality be-
comes ever increasing, and yet impossi-
ble to address. An individual subject is 
overwhelmed by a simultaneity of help-
lessness and endless striving. The ideal 
subject of the nation-state is the one 
who is made by, and accepts unques-
tioningly, the PNN form of governmen-
tality. As the case of India shows, with 
the combination of strategic silence and 
a deliberately proliferated lack of trust 
in general, questioning the emerging 
hegemonic discourse becomes difficult 
as the contradictions in its enactment 
come to be accepted as inevitable and 
necessary.23 Neoliberal nationalist ideas 
and practices come to be owned as 
postcolonial so long as it contributes to 
transforming the country into a rising 
power emulating, while still being dif-
ferent from, the West. 
The Indian Case
When Neoliberalism is seen as an economic phenomenon and nationalism is seen as 
a cultural one, what does such a binary 
achieve? 
The cultural effects of neoliberal-
ism, insofar as they are recognized from 
a neoliberal point of view, are seen as 
being essentially freeing, secularizing, 
modernizing, in short, Westernizing for 
the better. The cultural effects of neo-
liberalism from a nationalist point of 
view are seen as degenerative, immoral; 
Westernizing for worse. The economic 
effects of nationalism insofar as they are 
recognized from a neoliberal point of 
view are seen as being essentially pro-
tectionist and anti-developmental, in 
short opposing a Westernizing for the 
better. The economic effects of nation-
alism from a nationalist point of view 
are seen as necessary and potentially 
profitable for nation-building. 
Thus, when nationalism and 
neoliberalism are understood in mutu-
ally opposed registers, they enable both 
the immiserizing effects of neoliberal-
ism (greater inequality, monetization 
of relations, commodification of intan-
gibles) and the pernicious effects of na-
tionalism (revanchism, anti-minority 
populism, conservatism) to be seen as 
“unintended consequences,” and not as 
central to the creation of the subjectivi-
ties needed for the constitution of neo-
liberalism or nationalism. 
In India, the conundrum con-
cerning the simultaneity of the his-
torical arrival of neoliberalism (liber-
alization) and communalism (Hindu 
nationalism) illustrates how these two 
are usually analyzed separately, and 
thus, explanations that bridge this ana-
lytical gap are hard to find. For instance, 
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Chatterjee writes, “the juxtaposition of 
a globalizing economy and Hindu na-
tionalism is not a coincidence, and it 
brings us back to an apparent paradox 
that has baffled many academics,”24 and 
sees the answer in terms of a frustration 
with economic hardships that translat-
ed into a frustration with secular na-
tionalism. Likewise, Sarkar mentions 
how the “mass character suddenly ac-
quired by the Hindu right ... remains an 
explanatory as well as a political prob-
lem.”25 He provides an overview of the 
explanations, noting their unsatisfac-
tory and formulaic nature. The rise of 
the Hindutva nationalism is explained 
through the work done by the RSS and 
the recruitment strategies of the VHP; 
as an upper-caste backlash against the 
Mandalization; as a cultural/ethnic 
backlash against “globalization” which 
causes a surrender of the political and 
economic independence of the state; 
and as a response to the authoritarian 
and bureaucratic nature of Nehruvian 
developmental nationalism that pre-
ceded the religious nationalism of Hin-
dutva. In all such analyses, the arrival 
of neoliberalism in India is studied in 
the sphere of economy, and the rise 
of Hindutva is analyzed in the cultur-
al sphere—one is economic policy, the 
other is identity politics.26 The latter is 
often seen as a reaction to the former. 
The neoliberal reforms are seen as erod-
ing the power of the state and the re-
sort to nationalism of the religious kind 
serves to define a strong cultural iden-
tity in the midst of much drastic trans-
formation of the landscape. 
The argument here is that the 
economic policies of neoliberal reforms 
are no less nationalist or cultural in the 
way in which they conceptualize a “new 
India” that would be free of the shackles 
of the past and ready for the post-Cold 
War world. Both nationalism and neo-
liberalism are on a spectrum and in a re-
lationship with each other, and they are 
defined as separate by making the effects 
of one appear cultural, and of the other, 
economic. Furthermore, the role and 
status of the “West”27 as an imaginary 
means that it is imbued with the histor-
ical legacy of colonial memory re-called 
into the present as a revanchist pride, 
and combined with the conflicting as-
pirational/actual consumption desires 
to emulate the capitalist imperial met-
ropolitan fantasies. Neoliberalism and 
nationalism in the postcolonial context 
are better understood as two symptoms 
of this Western affect; both tied in to the 
Western epistemological construction 
of the economy and the nation-state, 
and thriving on the power effects that 
accompany this. The nonempirical 
signifier “West” is alternately funda-
mentalist and freeing in the universal 
pretense of its modernity. This lack of 
the West, that is conveyed by the prefix 
“non,” translates into what Chakrabarti 
and Dhar call the “dialectic of an imag-
ined past and an imagined future”28 that 
comes with a self-description for eco-
nomic third-worldism and need for de-
velopment so that India initially affirms 
its lack of development, then seeks to 
grow out of its third-world status, and 
then emerge as an economic superpow-
er. The contemporary right-wing ruling 
dispensation—the Modi-led BJP—le-
gitimizes itself by arguing that it is best 
placed to help India emerge as a power 
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like those countries seen as constituting 
the “West” without becoming “West-
ern.” In this self-legitimizing narrative, 
neoliberalism, nationalism, and postco-
loniality all operate in tandem. 
An understanding of PNN allows 
not just an interrogation of the culture/
development divide terms in national-
ism, but it also helps us to question the 
way in which viewing the material and 
symbolic domains as separate enables 
the global/local to be seen as opposed 
on identity versus economy. In this way, 
postcolonial nationalism is not perforce 
regressive as against neoliberal global-
ization. Chatterjee, drawing upon Ap-
padurai and Spivak, writes: “the global 
space is as much value-based as the lo-
cal, it is also as much fragmented as the 
local, and can be as much progressive/
regressive as the local.”29 By ignoring 
the fusing of the material and the sym-
bolic in the global and national spaces, 
we end up with a situation where “the 
global governance institutions pretend 
to be neutral, only in control of the re-
gimes of material production (econom-
ic level), and blaming the cultural pro-
duction of identity, ethnic, and religious 
fragmentation solely on the regressive 
local.”30 PNN allows for nationalism to 
be unshackled from an exclusively cul-
turalist domain and be seen as imbri-
cated in a postcoloniality (rather than 
just postcoloniality) that is marked by 
neoliberalism simultaneously in the na-
tional/international construction.
Finally, it might also be noted 
that the articulation of postcolonial 
with neoliberal with nationalism in 
the Indian context, as a way of under-
standing the changing architecture of 
socio-economic relationships, allows 
us to provide a different account of reli-
gion, one that does not place it beyond 
politics,31 but recognizes it as an integral 
part. The subsumption of religious par-
ticularity as politics in a democracy is 
not a uniquely postcolonial problem,32 
but it becomes especially pertinent 
under the conditions of neoliberal na-
tionalism with the hierarchical axes of 
vertical and horizontal power that call 
for a strategy of governmentality that is 
able to both monetize and expropriate 
religious belonging as necessary. To be 
“Hindu” today in contemporary India 
is therefore not simply about religion or 
nation. A political meaning to the Hin-
du identity is activated by linking it to 
entitlement and dispossession; defining 
it by the material or symbolic resources 
that it carries. This is evident in the dis-
crimination faced by non-Hindus in a 
range of interactions where they are pe-
nalized, in the “wages of religious priv-
ilege” (to adapt Du Bois’s term “wages 
of whiteness”) available even to the im-
poverished Hindus, and in the prolifer-
ating business empires of religious Hin-
du gurus turned businessmen (such as 
Baba Ramdev)33 who package national 
purity for profit.
Nation/Economy: Swadeshi 
and Make in India
So far, I have argued that, in our con-temporary world that is marked by postcoloniality, neoliberalism and 
nationalism are usually understood op-
positionally, and that this oppositional 
understanding makes one appear eco-
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nomic and the other cultural, as if each 
has their own endogenous and separa-
ble logics. Such an understanding relies 
upon, and allows for, the operation of a 
systematic mapping of a set of binaries 
such as local/international, material/
symbolic, and regressive/progressive. 
Furthermore, it facilitates the construc-
tion of a kind of politics of the absurd 
where the essentially “political” nature 
of contestation over the most import-
ant social questions is surrendered in 
favor of an inevitability about what are 
seen as the “economic” dynamics, and 
instead, the active manipulation and 
co-construction of imaginaries of the 
“nation” and “economy,” such as by the 
right-wing hegemonic successful proj-
ects, as in India (and elsewhere), is seen 
in terms of nationalist responses to 
neoliberalism. The yoking together of 
postcolonial with neoliberal with na-
tionalist as I have done here, to propose 
the functioning of a governmentality 
termed PNN, is presented as an ap-
proach that allows for the recognition of 
what is obscured and obfuscated when 
these dynamics are understood in sepa-
rate analytical registers. In other words, 
this governmentality approach reclaims 
the understanding of a political space 
linked to the functioning of imaginar-
ies in the construction of subjects in or-
der to obtain consent for specific policy 
regimes. In this final section, I discuss 
this political traffic between nation/
economy imaginaries with reference 
to the Indian example case of Swadeshi 
and “Make in India” projects.
Ideas about the co-construction 
of the nation and the economy can be 
run together in several ways.34 At its 
most basic, there is a resonance in the 
imaginary of the nation as a motherland 
or fatherland that demands sacrifice, 
submission, and duty, and the anthro-
pomorphic metaphors of the economy, 
such as that of the market as an individ-
ual prone to “nervousness” in the case 
of adverse (for example, labor-favoring) 
policies.35 Here, I wish to focus on how 
the imaginary of the economy can be 
yoked and co-constructed with that of 
the nation to make it possible to gener-
ate consent for different kinds of poli-
cies which might seem contradictory at 
first glance. 
In the bildungsroman of the BJP 
and its precursor organizations in India, 
we can read these chapters on the fus-
ings and transformations of economy/
nation. If the contemporaneous arrival 
of neoliberalism and Hindutva nation-
alism in India are seen to generate a par-
adox, consider how and why the BJP, as a 
Hindu nationalist party, furthered “glo-
balization” (read neoliberalism) when 
it succeeded in gaining power as part 
of the NDA coalition in 1999 and then 
came to power with massive majority 
in 2014. The answer to this is because 
BJP’s successes, like those of similarly 
ascendant right-wing parties elsewhere, 
rely upon the exercise of PNN; the eco-
nomic and cultural are intertwined in 
the so-called culturalist Hindutva vision 
of the BJP, its Sangh Parivar allies and 
its antecedent parties. Let me illustrate 
this with the example of the fusing of 
“Swadeshi” to “Make in India.” 
Swadeshi, which literally means 
“of one’s one country,” in the economic 
sense of promoting indigenous goods 
or domestic industry, especially cloth or 
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textiles, and boycotting foreign-made 
goods, became an important symbol 
and movement of self-reliance during 
the anti-colonial nationalist movement 
in India. As Bayly notes, “In the hands 
first of Bengali leaders and later of Ma-
hatma Gandhi and his supporters, the 
need to support swadeshi (home) in-
dustries and boycott foreign goods was 
woven through with notions of neigh-
bourliness, patriotism, purity, and sac-
rifice, all of which provided unifying 
ideologies more powerful than any 
single call for political representation 
and independence.”36 The Gandhian 
notion of swadeshi and its associated 
link with self-reliance37 was appropriat-
ed by the RSS and its early ideologues. 
Iwanek explains how right from its 
birth, “swadeshi had both a nationalist 
and economic edge to it”; stating that 
the RSS leader Deoras (from 1973 to 
1994, i.e., during the time of the econ-
omy “opening up” and later Hindutva 
ascendency onwards through the Babri 
Masjid demolition episode) support-
ed swadeshi and opposed trade liber-
alization.38 The SJM or the Swadeshi 
Jagran Manch39 was formed during his 
time in 1991 to oppose “Liberalization, 
Privatization, Globalization” (LPG). In 
the early 1990s, when the Manmohan 
Singh-led Congress “liberalized” the 
economy, the BJP specified that they 
agreed with “internal liberalization” but 
not with “external liberalization” or glo-
balization which they opposed through 
SJM-type affiliates of the Sangh Pari-
var. In spite of explicitly campaigning 
against this from early 1990s, when the 
BJP came to power in 1999, they pro-
moted precisely these policies.40
The BJP Finance Minister Yash-
want Sinha during the NDA rule (1998–
2002) redefined swadeshi to mean the 
following:41 
I understand swadeshi basical-
ly as a concept which will make 
India great. And India can be 
great only when we become an 
economic superpower .... We can 
be great by being able to com-
pete. I think competition is the 
essence. I am a great believer in 
competition. We are willing to 
face it abroad and here. After the 
nuclear tests, to think that we will 
go the East India Company way, 
or that transnationals will come 
in and take over, or that they will 
exercise undue influence, that 
foreign investment should be 
resisted—these are all concepts 
which are not valid anymore. 
And therefore, swadeshi, global-
izer, liberalizer are not contradic-
tions in terms. I personally think 
that globalization is the best way 
of being swadeshi. 
Likewise, L.K. Advani, a se-
nior-most BJP figure and a key mem-
ber of the triumvirate that saw the BJP 
come to prominence in the early 1990s, 
said the following in a speech in 1998 
when he was the Home Minister:42
 ... globalisation is a fundamental 
fact of our times. Neither its re-
ality nor its irreversibility can be 
questioned ... Swadeshi is a pos-
itive thought rooted In national 
self-confidence: ... By Swadeshi 
I mean the belief that there can 
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be no uniform solution to the 
problems of economic and social 
development in a world which is 
both inherently diverse and also 
unequally structured today be-
cause of historical factors .... Our 
achievements in culture, special-
ly, an [sic] of great relevance to 
the world community facing an 
uncertain and worrying future. 
This is what I mean by Swadeshi. 
It has a positive content and 
thrust. It connotes national pride 
and self-confidence. It connotes 
Swavalamban or self-reliance. 
For no nation can solve its prob-
lems, much less attain heights of 
glory by becoming dependent 
on others .... Swadeshi, howev-
er, is not a negative belief which 
advocates isolationism. In an in-
creasingly interdependent and 
interconnected world, no nation 
is given the luxury of isolation-
ism. Globalisation yes, but on the 
solid foundations of Swadeshi.
Swadeshi is therefore both a 
national self-confidence necessary in 
a world where glory cannot come by 
being dependent on others, and, at the 
same time, it is also a facilitator for glo-
balization in an interdependent world 
where isolationism is not an option. 
These redefinitions of swadeshi as na-
tional interest allow a simultaneity of 
commitment to swadeshi and to global-
ization, to Hindutva nationalism, and 
to neoliberalism. While scholars have 
pointed out the way in which the BJP 
has been inconsistent in its positions—
Arulanantham refers to the “protean 
and nimble philosophy” of swadeshi 
and the “ideological flexibility” of the 
BJP,43 Jaffrelot mentions the “division 
of labour,”44 Noorani speaks of the “cal-
culated ambiguity”45 of the Sangh Pari-
var and its leaders—the argument here 
is that a key element of the successful 
governmental strategy for the BJP has 
been the construction, representation, 
definition, and manipulation of the 
various domains that are later seen to 
relate to different aspects of economy 
and society. When the first nuclear test 
was conducted by India under the NDA 
government, this move was projected 
as being about national pride, yet the 
neoliberal economy was an equal part 
of this story. Nayar remarks upon this 
paradox, “the assertion of nationalism 
through the nuclear tests quickened the 
pace of government approval of foreign 
investment proposals in an endeavor to 
compensate for the fall in official trade 
flows and to strengthen the business 
lobby abroad against the sanctions.”46 
The concept of swadeshi—and 
the way it can structure understand-
ings of national interest versus inter-
national compulsions, domestic indus-
try (plus economic virtue) promotion 
versus appeals of multinational capital 
and business interests—is now trans-
mogrified into the Modi-led BJP’s cam-
paign of “Make in India.” The Make in 
India scheme was mentioned by Modi 
in his first Independence Day speech 
on August 15, 2014, and subsequent-
ly launched on September 25, 2014. A 
Make in India week was launched in 
Mumbai in February 2016,47 there have 
been other slick and expensive mar-
keting campaigns. Its twitter summary 
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calls it “A major national program de-
signed to facilitate investment, foster 
innovation, enhance skill development 
and build best-in-class manufacturing 
infrastructure.” There is considerable 
irony in how the well-recognized “Make 
in India” logo—a lion made up of inter-
connected gears—was designed by a 
foreign firm (a fact revealed by a Right 
to Information or RTI application),48 
or that at the launch event in Septem-
ber 2014, PM Modi stood in front of 
a “Make in India” sign in English and 
in literally lettered Hindi (without any 
Hindi translation)49 and spoke of his 
definition of FDI for Indians as “First 
Develop India.”50
The official Make in India page 
says the following:51
Program
The Make in India program was 
launched by Prime Minister 
Modi in September 2014 as part 
of a wider set of nation-building 
initiatives. Devised to transform 
India into a global design and 
manufacturing hub, Make in 
India was a timely response to a 
critical situation: by 2013, the 
much-hyped emerging markets 
bubble had burst, and India’s 
growth rate had fallen to its low-
est level in a decade. The promise 
of the BRICS nations had fad-
ed, and India was tagged as one 
of the so-called “Fragile Five”. 
Global investors debated whether 
the world’s largest democracy was 
a risk or an opportunity. India’s 
1.2 billion citizens questioned 
whether India was too big to suc-
ceed or too big to fail. India was 
on the brink of severe economic 
failure.
Process
 ... It was a powerful, galvanising 
call to action to India’s citizens 
and business leaders, andan in-
vitation to potential partners and 
investors around the world. But, 
Make in India is much more than 
an inspiring slogan. It represents 
a comprehensive and unprec-
edented overhaul of out-dated 
processes and policies. Most im-
portantly, it represents a complete 
change of the Government’s mind-
set—a shift from issuing authori-
ty to business partner, in keeping 
with Prime Minister Modi’s ten-
et of “Minimum Government, 
Maximum Governance”.
Progress
... The most striking indica-
tor of progress is the unprec-
edented opening up of key 
sectors—including Railways, De- 
fence, Insurance, and Medical 
Devices—to dramatically high-
er levels of Foreign Direct In- 
vestment .... Today, India’s credi-
bility is stronger than ever. There 
is visible momentum, energy and 
optimism. Make in India is open-
ing investment doors. Multiple 
enterprises are adopting its man-
tra. The world’s largest democracy 
is well on its way to becoming the 
world’s most powerful economy.
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The backdrop of these statements 
is vital to unpack. In 2013, the various 
vested interests with an effective voice 
and exit option, distilled and anthro-
pomorphized as “market sentiments,” 
were volatile, and as the 2014 elections 
neared, it was made clear that the “time 
for making bold new reforms is run-
ning out, with national elections due to 
take place by May 2014.”52 Deconstruct-
ing the framing of the “Make in India” 
introduction for how it juxtaposes the 
political/economic/cultural, we can see 
how the Make in India is meant to be 
the “nation-building” program that 
has been delivered by Modi, the man 
who “saved” the failing economy, and 
a democracy that was “too risky to be 
banked” upon. The elections in May 
2014 that brought the Modi-led BJP to 
power were preceded by a juggernaut of 
corporate media reports and a densely 
saturated media where Modi was every-
where, including where he was not, by 
way of his holograms. In order to bring 
the savior into power as the CEO of the 
country as company (he was indeed fe-
licitated in terms of the country getting 
a new CEO), the nation/economy had to 
be represented as failing. With the GDP 
growing at just below 5%, the pressure 
was being piled up by a range of actors 
in a way that the “economy” was being 
coded for the country, the (Hindu/busi-
ness) nation, and “development” was 
the answer for all the malaise. There 
were promising returns in all these for 
the large investors/investment in Modi 
(his campaign was the most expensive 
in the history of the country, and every 
surge in his popularity ratings resulted 
in massive gains on the stock markets 
for businesses like Ambani and Adani, 
Modi’s long-term backers from Gujarat, 
who had invested in his political cam-
paign),53 but developmental returns 
were promised to everyone in poverty 
who would be provided with “maxi-
mum government” in spite of reduc-
tion in inefficient government expen-
diture and “minimum governance.” A 
sense of pride was promised to every 
Indian overseas and within the coun-
try, upon the conditionality that they 
not be “anti-national”—where anti-na-
tionals could be those opposing not just 
state violence (human rights activists) 
but also those opposing neoliberal ex-
ploitation (environmental activists). 
Under the right wing in India, these 
“anti-nationals” have become the tar-
get of serious abuse, vilified as “foreign 
funded” and “western-backed” for their 
protest against foreign/western compa-
nies that seek to exploit Indian resourc-
es and vulnerable local populations, by 
supporters of “nationalist” super-rich 
industrialists who seek to restore the 
nation to some untainted pre-colonial 
“Hindu” past, while also making it a 
Western-style economy of malls and 
four-lane super highways. 
In this nation-building exercise 
of “Make in India,” swadeshi plays a cu-
rious role by its absence yet presence.54 
The lack of mention of swadeshi on 
Make in India page may, at first, be in-
terpreted as the sign of an aggressively 
neoliberal government that is, in fact, 
pro-market, and has given up on the 
“backward” sort of economic nation-
alism that its RSS grassroots supported 
and continue to support. However, on 
a closer look, this is contestable. Where 
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once the BJP’s success relied upon a 
melding of swadeshi and globalization, 
now that requires a further fusing with 
the idea of creating a global manufac-
turing hub. 
As the examples below illustrate, 
Make in India is simultaneously claimed 
to follow from Gandhian Swadeshi and 
to promote economic nation-building 
through encouraging neoliberal incen-
tives for foreign firms to manufacture 
in India which is now projected globally 
as a free-market-friendly deregulating 
economy. But, Make in India also seems 
to be consonant with import-substitut-
ing industrialization, which would be 
the conventional opposite of free-mar-
ket principles. So, the Rajasthan Chief 
Minister Vasundhara Raje stated,  “Ma-
hatma Gandhi’s Swadeshi movement 
and the ‘Make in India’ programme were 
based on the same ideology,” adding 
that “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 
‘Make in India’ encouraged the feeling 
of ‘swadeshi’ to make India economi-
cally independent and self-sustaining, 
which was the need of the hour.”55 Yet at 
the same time as Make in India claims 
to be opening “investment doors” in a 
free-market-friendly neoliberal new In-
dia, there is also the report that: “Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi has asked 
Union ministries to discourage ‘ines-
sential imports’ and leverage the coun-
try’s manufacturing skills in substitut-
ing them. Towards this end, the Union 
ministries are required to furnish status 
reports every quarter and also brief the 
Prime Minister.”56 The response to this 
obvious import-substituting approach, 
which will rely upon the government 
investment rather than on FDI in Make 
in India, has been to call out Make in 
India as “swadeshi through the back 
door” and as something harking back 
to the days of “Be Indian, Buy Indian.”57 
As a result, while some have 
called Make in India “a more radical de-
parture from the principle of swadeshi, 
consonant with a classical liberal un-
derstanding of ‘minimum govern-
ment’ in national economic affairs,”58 
others see it as “modest deregulation 
wrapped up in a swadeshi cloth,”59 and 
still others have called for “Make for 
India” and “Made by India.”60 The Re-
serve Bank of India (RBI) Governor at 
the time, Raghuram Rajan, cautioned 
that Make in India should instead be 
Make for India.61 In his view, Make for 
India should be focused on increasing 
domestic demand by pursuing a range 
of reforms, since a manufacturing-fo-
cused strategy of export-oriented in-
dustrialization will not work in the cur-
rent global climate where other Asian 
economies are already well on way to 
pursuing such a strategy, and a strate-
gy of import substitution will increase 
inefficiency, decrease competition, and 
increase costs to consumers. Rejecting 
this, the Finance Minister Jaitley said, 
“Whether Make in India is made for 
consumers within India or outside is 
not so relevant. The principle today says 
that consumers across the world like to 
purchase products that are cheaper and 
are of good quality. They hire services 
which are cheaper and good quality.”62 
Projecting meaning to these multiple 
domains of nation and economy which 
are co-constructed in a fluid sense as 
a governmental strategy of the ruling 
right wing in India, Make in India can 
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be seen as an abandonment of the ideal 
of swadeshi, as a timely reinterpretation 
of swadeshi in a globalized world, as a 
backdoor way of introducing swadeshi 
against the norms of free-market poli-
cies, as an exercise in national pride, as 
a way of signaling neoliberal openness.
Conclusion
Nationalism and neoliberalism are often understood to be op-posed ideologies. This paper 
has argued that such an oppositional 
understanding, especially in light of the 
rise of the Right in the contemporary 
postcolonial world, misses the com-
plex ways in which the two intermingle. 
Both nationalism and neoliberalism 
work together in a PNN governmental-
ity that makes people, populations, and 
citizens, consent to specific policies, 
as ideas of nation-state and economy 
are co-constructed. The postcolonial 
nation-state, entangled in the middle, 
continues to mimic the West as well 
as repudiate it. I have attempted to 
uncover this nuanced form of govern-
mentality (PNN) in the case of India 
and demonstrated its working through 
the example of BJP’s use of Swadeshi 
with Make in India. By appropriating 
neoliberal practices in the name of na-
tion-building, the BJP transforms the 
idea of the Indian nation with claims 
of making it stronger and more suited 
to join the club of modern rising pow-
ers, and deploys nationalist rhetoric to 
domesticate any criticism of neoliberal 
policies. The BJP’s powerful stitching 
together of Swadeshi and Make in India 
logic shows that far from there being a 
contradiction in the ideologies of neo-
liberalism and nationalism in the way in 
which they are pitted against each other 
through the Market versus State narra-
tive, the political and the economic are 
inextricably intertwined in the dynamic 
which is insufficiently understood if we 
look at neoliberalism or nationalism in 
isolation. The successes of the contem-
porary Right owe significantly to how 
they deploy both neoliberalism and na-
tionalism as part of the same technique 
of governmentality, which is rooted in 
the appeal to a constructed postcolonial 
sentiment in the way in which it ties the 
rising power status to aspirations his-
torically denied by the West. 
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